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ABSTRACT 
 
Resource management problems have so often defied prediction that surprise rather than 
certainty has become the common theme for embarrassed managers and theoreticians.  The sources of 
uncertainty derive from our failure to grasp the structure and operation of complex systems: nested 
hierarchies that generate non-linear dynamics from within-scale and cross-scale interactions.  We 
increasingly recognize that surprise and uncertainty are inevitable given that nature and society are 
moving targets with very complicated interactions at multiple scales. How can we practically address 
this uncertainty?  We describe a process, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management 
(AEAM), that has developed over 30 years of experiments as a test of our abilities to integrate inquiry, 
understanding, and action in the face of surprising shifts in evolving resource systems.  AEAM has 
been applied to resource management problems such as tourism, fisheries, forestries, mining and 
agriculture. We consider briefly AEAM’s application to river management problems in North America 
and discuss the potential to experiment with AEAM to address the interplay of ecological and 
economic problems in European river basins with a history of flooding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The speed and extent of change in natural and human systems are accelerating 
at unprecedented scales, forcing managers to make a qualitative leap and look over 
their conceptual horizon to find the sources of change.  The qualitative difference in 
our appreciation of change is more than multi-disciplinary or multi-sectoral; it 
challenges the foundations of most models of the world as a continuum of various 
attributes.  The qualitative leaps needed to understand the new dimensions of change 
seem to reflect a hierarchical world in which a few sets of processes control operation 
and structure over limited ranges of scale.  If change is not occurring uniformly 
everywhere, but only over specific ranges of scale, then understanding must jump 
from the local to the regional and global strata of the world hierarchy.  Our failure to 
appreciate hierarchy is often compounded by ignorance of the unexpected and non-
linear dynamism of human and natural systems.  Profound surprise and uncertainty are 
the result, and they are replacing stability and predictability as the common themes to 
managing change.   
The degree and quality of uncertainty inherent in the dynamics of ecological, 
social and economic change can be classified as statistical uncertainty, model 
uncertainty, or fundamental uncertainty (Hilborn 1987).  Lay discourse about change 
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may acknowledge the shallowest level of uncertainty, statistical uncertainty, wherein 
one may not know the condition of a variable at any one point, but the overall chances 
of its occurrence (probability distribution) are known.  An example of this might be 
the chances of being struck by lightning.  More profound kinds of uncertainty are 
currently encountered at the frontiers of science and practice.  For example, the depth 
of surprises occurring in natural and human systems are forcing us to reexamine our 
most basic ideas about how variables are connected in a model (model uncertainty) or 
whether we can conceive of any model at all that applies (fundamental uncertainty) 
(Peterson et al. 1997).  In the case of model uncertainty one still can predict outcomes 
but have no idea of their likelihood.  For instance, evidence from periodic drops in 
Europe’s temperatures are best explained at present by the switching off of a deep 
ocean current, the Atlantic Conveyor, yet we have little idea what processes combine 
to toggle these systems on and off and less of an idea of their likelihood (Broecker 
1996). Fundamental uncertainty applies to situations so novel that no current model 
applies.  The discovery of the atmospheric ozone hole exemplified such profound 
novelty; we couldn’t even bring up a cast of characters let alone a set of relationships 
between them.  One begins to appreciate the complexity of systems when one realizes 
that, as our Earth is increasingly connected by ecological and human processes, all 
three levels of uncertainty can apply at any one place.  
Uncertainty challenges more than our need to understand, because the 
responsibility to manage systems of humans and nature creates a tension between the 
need for useful simplifications that allow discussion (theory) and the need for 
effective action (practice). This tension increases as the uncertainty springing from 
Nature is compounded by that contributed by society’s attempts to learn and manage. 
Both natural and human systems are constantly changing and evolving, sometimes in 
synchrony and sometimes not.  If our appreciation of uncertainty in the face of 
evolution forces us to admit that there are no “truths” which persist, and that no 
person or group is the guardian of such truths, then we can recognize the importance 
of discussion between a variety of competing ideas.  In this paper we confront the 
question, “If we admit that we cannot eliminate uncertainty, then what means are 
available to reduce it when we try to understand and manage unpredictable disruptions 
such as floods?”  We will first discuss briefly some of the sources of uncertainty in 
nature and society, then we will introduce a process of democratic dialogue, Adaptive 
Environmental Assessment and Management (AEAM), that attempts to practically 
address the tension between theory and practice by deepening understanding even as 
the system is managed.  We  will conclude by suggesting ways AEAM could be 
applied to enhance the understanding and management of floods. 
Sources of Uncertainty in Nature and Society 
Natural Systems 
The unpredictable (‘non-linear’) behavior and surprisingly stratified 
(‘hierarchical’) structure of natural systems contribute greatly to uncertainty.  Natural 
systems rarely remain on a constant, predicable course; their behavior can erupt in 
episodes of transformation, recognized in antiquity in biblical terms: plagues, 
pestilence, fire, and flood (Holling et al. 1995).  Forests may appear to grow at a 
reassuring pace for decades only to be consumed in outbreaks of insect pests or fire.  
Rare events, such as storms, floods or biological invasions, can radically and 
unpredictably restructure systems with effects lasting for long periods.  For example, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will not guarantee the flow of the Mississippi River 
through the city of New Orleans, because it is finally recognized that no practicable 
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level of engineering can prevent certain hurricanes from redirecting the Mississippi 
down the Achafalaya basin.  Such infrequent episodes can also cause systems to jump 
irreversibly to new states; forests become grasslands, grasslands become shrublands or 
deserts.  
Surprise from natural systems comes partly from our failure to recognize the 
hierarchical pattern of their behavior and structure.  Briefly, ecosystems are not 
uniform or continuous in space or time, an assumption about pattern that has made 
predictions much easier to make in the past, but has lead to tragic and unforeseen 
consequences.  Natural systems are patchy and heterogeneous in space and 
discontinuous in time.  Forests are not uniform mono-cultures but mosaics of patches 
of different trees and groups of trees.  The processes that give these systems their 
architecture or structure do not operate uniformly at the same time and space scales.  
They have different “footprints “ because they function at radically different rates and 
over vastly different spatial extents, often differing by orders of magnitude in time 
(seconds to millennia) and space (centimeters to kilometers). For example at micro-
scales the competition for sunlight and water and nutrients results in plant architecture 
and operates over square meters in spurts of seconds to hours.  Medium scale 
processes (fire or flood) create and maintain the patchwork of the landscape, operating 
over square kilometers in episodes that occur every 10 to 50 years. And macro-scale 
processes, such as geomorphology, structure the landscape over hundreds of 
kilometers, returning periodically over millennia.  Therefore, each stratum (range of 
scales) in the landscape hierarchy is dominated by a different set of processes; no 
process is dominant at all scales.  
Figure 1 shows such a discontinuous world by diagramming the space and 
time dimensions of different elements of a forest and climate hierarchy.  Each polygon 
shows the minimum resolution (left for space or bottom for time) at which the 
phenomenon is perceivable, and the horizon (right for space and top for time) over 
which the phenomenon is replaced.  For example, a forest stand is visible on a screen 
with pixels 10 meters on a side, and most stands are less than 5 kilometers in extent.  
Similarly, forest stand dynamics can be captured at a minimum time step of a year and 
a time horizon of a century.  These polygons attempt to map out the dimensions at 
which the processes that create forest stands (or any other element in the hierarchy) 
operate.  In a sense, each polygon is a “footprint” in space and time of the set of 
processes that dominate at that scale.  This diagram pictures the hypothesis that there 
is no overlap between the scale ranges at which different sets of processes dominate.  
Sunlight may be omnipresent, but the process of competition for energy, nutrients and 
water that result in a plant do not dominate at the scales of kilometers.  At that scale, 
processes such as fire, flood, human agriculture and forestry dominate to give the 
meso-scale patterns of the landscape mosaic.  Like a Chinese puzzle, the domain of 
micro-scale processes fits within those of the meso-scale, which in turn fit within 
those of the macro-scale.   
What are the consequences of such a novel world that is not continuous in its 
behavior or its appearance? These disjunctions in space and time force us to radically 
revise how we build our understanding up to predict what will happen in systems as 
large as nature.  They mean that traditional methods of extrapolating from the small to 
the large, from the present into the future, do not work.  Namely, one cannot 
extrapolate understanding of microscopic phenomena (that which we can most easily 
observe and test) and scale it up to understand the functioning of the environment at 
larger scales (forests, towns, regions, states).  The local control offered by one dam 
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gives little power to predict the behavior of water over an entire river basin.  We must 
observe and test the processes and phenomena at the appropriate scale, and at larger 
scales experimental replication and control are often not practicable or possible.   
Systems do not remain the same but shift or jump between states.  Systems 
that from a human bias appear stable actually are changing slowly within some limited 
domain of behavior. Leaps to new domains are the surprises that embarrass theorists 
and managers.  We now recognize from such reversible and irreversible jumps that 
systems do not have one single balance point or equilibrium.  They are often multi-
equilibrial, and jumps between different states are increasingly recognized (Holling et 
al. 1995) for their contributions to diversity, structure and resilience of these systems.  
What have been labeled as ‘disturbances’, with the connotation of degradation from 
an ideal state, are now seen more as ‘envigorating’ gymnastics that bolster the long-
term integrity of the system. These new insights do not disparage the concept of 
stability as some source of unhealthy stasis; stability is recognized for its contributions 
to productivity and bio-geochemical cycles.  Therefore, it is not disturbance or 
stability but the cycling between them that now appears to be the engine of evolution 
and resilience.  
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Human Systems 
Like natural systems, human systems are also moving targets that occasionally 
jump erratically in shifting between system types.  The uncertainty inherent in shifting 
natural systems can be amplified by interactions with dynamic human societies that 
are also disjunct in geographical distribution and behavior.  Many societies have 
moved forward in leaps in terms of technology and/or social institutions, and attempts 
to understand and cope with nature’s variability have quite often built up from initial 
success to catastrophic collapses.  For example in some fisheries’ early harvests 
spurred successive bursts in capital and technology that eventually ratcheted harvest 
efforts up and fish stocks down to levels requiring possibly a century for recovery 
(Walters 1986). Below we briefly discuss how our confidence in dealing with natural 
catastrophes has been eroded by the mixed success of some institutions and facets of 
society.  
Government, commerce and science are three broad vehicles for managing 
uncertainty inherent in complex human and/or natural systems.  The constraint of law, 
the discipline of the market, and the scientific method are all means which partly serve 
to minimize variability of certain behaviors of people and/or natural resources, or the 
supply and flow of money that tracks these behaviors.  The mounting scope of 
resource management failures has caused widespread loss of confidence in these 
institutions, both individually and in concert.  Governmental failures to understand or 
manage resources have emerged most strikingly in command-and-control approaches 
of centralized authority.  Such approaches ignore further experimentation or local 
wisdom as they lock in to one most efficient means of production, and often continue 
to roll forward on political momentum long after local economies and ecologies have 
been devastated.  The Soviet management of Eastern Europe is one of the most 
extreme examples of central control resulting in some of the most patent failures to 
understand or respond to evolving ecosystems or societies.  However, non-socialist 
examples abound because authority is often concentrated in industry and/or 
government.  And the current trend toward globalization of economies can be 
criticized as an unhealthy concentration of power whose attempts to minimize 
variability at global levels makes the system more brittle and vulnerable to collapse at 
world scales.   
Sometimes governments and private industry work as partners to try and 
guarantee smooth and steady economies by suppressing variability and uncertainty of 
natural variables.  Predictable availability of electricity or transport are created by 
steadying river flow with dams, and dependable deliveries of food result from 
pesticide use to eliminate sudden outbreaks of insects or microbes.  Many of these 
dual efforts have resulted in massive failures of such shared resources as fisheries, 
farms and forestry, or in catastrophic releases of toxic materials.  Often government 
and/or industry have distorted science through clumsy attempts at information 
manipulation in order to cover the fact that management actions have no real basis in 
knowledge.  Management agencies often suppress scientific dissent in order to present 
a unified, "certain" front to the outside world, thereby consolidating the political 
power of the agency (Walters 1997).  
For many, science has lost the aura of a compelling tool for understanding or 
prediction for a number of reasons.  The fact that the same data can legitimately be 
interpreted in radically different ways is at first baffling and then increasingly 
ridiculous to the popular mind.  One might expect the confusion over science to 
increase as the scale of disturbances increases, because science loses the ability to 
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replicate and control experiments as their scale expands.  While this is true, in 
addition science suffers from a reputation inflated by revisionist histories that filter 
out the original controversies surrounding scientific discoveries.  In a sense, science is 
falling from a pedestal created by idealized visions of a history of “strong” science, 
replete with clean breakthroughs that could relieve us of confusion and uncertainty by 
dramatic and unassailable demonstrations of causation.  Actually, such demonstrations 
are very rare, and the actual importance of many famous discoveries is only 
recognized in hindsight.  Rutherford’s dramatic 1920 “vindication” of Einstein’s 
theory of relativity was actually not a very clear demonstration at all, and was 
challenged for years by other interpretations (Collins and Pinch 1993).  The problem 
for science as a tool for exploring uncertainty is that few but scientists have the tools, 
the discipline or the patience to wade through the controversy and see the real and 
compelling patterns of evidence emerge over years.  And as larger 
economic/ecological experiments occur in the biosphere, the increasing number of 
interrelated causes will not clarify the picture sooner, rather the signals and evidence 
found will be murkier than before. 
The challenge of usefully applying science emerges clearly in some attempts to 
understand and manage complex systems by quantifying indices of system “integrity.”  
These attempts assume that complex systems are composed of components with 
relatively constant and tight relationships that consistently behave in a certain way, 
and, hence, have a ‘normal’ state against which to compare transient states.  Actually, 
such systems are “open, loosely defined assemblages with only weak evolutionary 
relationship to one another” (Levin 1992) and their constant change makes it very hard 
to define what ‘normal’ is (De Leo and Levin 1997).  Consistent local disturbance 
(tidal flux) may allow highly competing species to coexist, or catastrophes (fire, 
floods) may periodically reset the clock by eliminating most species.  While 
separating the effects of human from natural disturbance is difficult, these problems 
are compounded by the variety of connections between different components resulting 
in different functions.  Therefore, what ‘health’ an index reveals is related to which 
components and which functions are present and measurable at that point in the cycle 
of change in the system.  Quantification may give one a ‘spurious sense of certainty’ 
because components have been reduced to numbers and are more easily 
communicated so as to make a convincing scientific or political statement.  As DeLeo 
and Levin (1997) conclude: 
 
 “A more promising approach to ecosystem management is to 
recognize that various genetic, competitive, and behavioral processes 
(rather than states) are responsible for maintaining the key features of 
observed ecosystems, and that the dynamics of these processes vary 
with the scale of description.” 
 
Opportunities to Integrate Understanding in the Face of Uncertainty 
If our initial successes in eliminating variability and uncertainty have lead to 
more profound catastrophes, how can we responsibly engage or embrace uncertainty 
and effectively respond to change?  The challenge for society is that not only must 
understanding be consistently pursued and deepened to appreciate dynamic and 
evolving systems, but that one must take action in the midst of this effort.  In other 
words, coping with novelty and surprise requires the sustained capacity to learn and to 
flexibly manage.  For thirty years a decision making process has been evolving to 
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address the twin challenges of learning and management.  This process, Adaptive 
Environmental Assessment and Management (AEAM), has been refined in a series of 
on-the-ground applications in problems of forestry, fisheries, national parks, and river 
systems.  It is currently being applied in two North American river systems, the 
Mississippi and the Colorado, and offers opportunities to address the development of 
society on flooding riparian systems.  We will describe with examples some of the 
theory and operation of the AEAM process. 
 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
 
Underlying Assumptions 
As previously discussed, the driving assumption underlying AEAM is that 
uncertainty is inevitable, because the behavior of natural resource systems is only 
partly knowable.  Therefore, as ecosystems and societies evolve, so humans must 
adapt and conform as systems change.  However, the challenge of environmental 
problems denies us the luxury to constrain our focus simply to understanding.  Society 
must respond at a number of levels that include both understanding and management.  
Historically, the understanding that was developed in isolation from the discipline of 
reacting to and managing a changing system has often proven shallow and of limited 
use. Therefore, AEAM is not about learning before one can manage, rather it is 
learning while one manages (Gunderson, 1998). 
How can management and learning be coordinated?  Based on the assumption 
that structured learning is better than trial and error, AEAM is based on a process of 
Integrated Learning (Figure 2).  As Gunderson (1998) notes, “The process is 
structured for learning by systematically probing uncertainties of resource issues, 
continually assessing, postulating, testing and re-evaluating.” 
If evolving complex adaptive systems are fountains of uncertainty, and 
surprise is inevitable, then structured learning is the way that uncertainty is winnowed.  
Surprise is never eliminated, but we may reduce the consequences of the way our 
understanding lags behind evolving systems by embracing uncertainty, deepening 
understanding and adaptively responding to system changes.  Adaptive responses and 
management actions must meet social objectives, such as protecting people or 
resources, but learning must continue as policies are modified to adapt to surprises.  
And therefore, a second function of management is to probe the system, perturbing it 
slightly to provoke some minimal, safe response that gives an indication of the 
working and true structure of the system (Walters, 1986).  In this way, AEAM views 
policies as hypotheses, therefore management actions become treatments in an 
experiment.   
We shall now discuss in turn the functioning of the different phases of AEAM, 
how uncertainty is confronted by formulating hypotheses, how management actions 
test these hypotheses, and how learning integrates assessment and management.  We 
shall then describe one example of AEAM as applied in a wetland savanna ecosystem 
in Florida.   
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Figure 2. Key ingredients contributing to structured learning in the AEAM process. 
 
 
Assessing the Known and the Uncertain 
The assessment phase simultaneously engages two apparent opposites, 
integrated understanding and uncertainty, and counter-poses them in ways that are 
revealing to both.  Rather than dodging uncertainty with simplifying assumptions or 
rationalizations, the AEAM process focuses on uncertainty from the very beginning, 
utilizing disagreements to reveal and highlight gaps in understanding and other 
sources of uncertainty.  The adaptive process identifies new bases for sharing 
understanding when gaps or uncertainties are recognized as common to all the 
different disciplines, sectors, occupations, trainings and experiences represented in the 
discussion.   
The common gaps and links in understanding can bridge the various 
backgrounds present and establish a foundation of trust that may eventually unlock 
information and experiences that were previously unshared.  This trust is one way in 
which the AEAM process addresses the refusal to share information, a frequent source 
of gridlock in environmental decision processes.  Another way is to select 
representatives of various backgrounds based on competence, respect within their 
group and the willingness to cooperate.  Participants are given to understand, that a 
great potential for communication can emerge if only each person “leaves his/her gun 
at the door”, be that gun an opinion, a philosophy or a mandate from one’s 
organization. 
The assessment phase aims to initiate and foster discussion by using an 
informal workshop setting and computer models.  Care is taken to introduce and use 
computer models simply as translators and integrators of people’s understanding, not 
as technically superior vehicles of “truth.”  If dialogue begins where there was none 
before, then the computer model has succeeded.  If people begin to seriously reassess 
their assumptions because model output based on their ideas seems questionable, then 
important and novel insights are possible.   
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The goal of the assessment phase is to integrate understanding and ponder 
uncertainties to the point that they can be clearly stated as hypotheses about how the 
system works and what effects interventions (management or uncontrolled human 
actions) might produce.  Complexity in adaptive systems is partly the result of the 
diversity of causes, and the alternative explanations that address these causes can 
become the basis for policy in the next phase. 
 
Policies as Hypotheses 
Policies are the governing plan, the question set based on experience that sets 
the stage of further action.  Policies range from the formal (government acts, laws, 
administrative code, legal contracts) to the informal (understandings and shared views 
among groups).  Instead of pursuing the ‘correct’ policy as a solution to problems, 
AEAM differs from traditional engines of policy by looking for policy that addresses 
other social objectives as well as the need to learn in the face of uncertainty 
(Gunderson 1998).  In this light, policies are not magic bullets that address the right 
mix of objectives to solve a problem, rather they are astute hypotheses about how the 
world works or “Questions masquerading as answers” in the words of Steve Light.  
AEAM embraces uncertainty by trying to find the best questions, and thereby tries to 
dodge the trap of assuming certainty by rallying around ‘solutions.’ 
 
Management Actions as Tests 
Many environmental problems stem from administrative pathologies that 
narrow policy to achieve efficiency at the expense of awareness about where the 
system is going.  For example, if initial policies achieve high production, one could 
bank on maximizing the profit of such success by cutting research costs, but only if 
one was sure of where the system is going.  The AEAM process strives to avoid this 
pathology by broadening implementation to mean the testing and evaluating of 
hypotheses (policies).  This prevents the intent of policy from being changed during 
implementation, and shifts the search for efficiency from cost reduction to checking 
whether management actions were executed as anticipated (Gunderson, 1998).  This 
gives implementation a disciplinary rigor of consistency in execution, because 
otherwise the test of the policy becomes meaningless, and one has loses the power to 
gain new information about the system. 
 
Integrative Learning 
Amassing information does little to help anticipate surprise and uncertainty.  
Projections based on previous system behaviors have limited utility in the face of true 
novelty.  Integration of the information gained in policy probes has little to do with 
data quantity and everything to do with quality.  To what extent have we winnowed 
uncertainty and closed the gap on these elusive and dynamic systems?  Enhancing 
understanding through integrated learning is a second loop type of learning that is 
fundamental to adaptive management in several ways.  First, it integrates across 
multiple disciplines and backgrounds.  Second, the focus group, and the community at 
large, learns by doing. In this way understanding deepens by probing the workings of 
ecosystems and society and by considered and thoughtful sharing of new ideas and 
previous experiences.  Such inquiry is structured by expert facilitation of discussion, 
summing up new insights and consolidating gains before reformulating the questions 
at hand.  Finally, this understanding often builds from ground made more fertile by 
complete re-inspection of assumptions and conceptual frameworks (Gunderson 1998). 
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The Everglades: An Example of AEAM Applied 
One of the key objectives of adaptive assessments of a resource issue is to 
highlight uncertainties and generate a number of plausible hypotheses about the issue.  
The AEAM process develops these hypotheses as a suite of alternative explanations 
about the behavior of the resource.  The process of considering the suite of competing 
ideas helps to integrate concepts about ecology, economy, or politics and to weigh the 
various policy options.  Therefore, the hypotheses link our understanding of the issue 
with the range of possible outcomes that management actions might produce 
(Gunderson 1998).  We illustrate this below using the example of wading bird 
declines in a wet savanna known as Everglades National Park in Florida. 
Wading bird populations have declined dramatically (as much as 95 percent) 
over the past 70 years in South Florida (Bancroft 1989).  The Everglades National 
Park provided a primary nesting site for millions of birds at the beginning of this 
century, and these numbers have declined to the tens of thousands.  An AEAM 
process, convened in 1989, a number of alternative hypotheses were posed to explain 
these population declines (Light et al. 1995).  We briefly paraphrase each alternative 
explanation below. 
- Shrunken Habitat: The conversion of portions of the Everglades by 
agriculture and urbanization has decreased the original area to half its size.  
This area has low biological productivity per unit area, so loss of productive 
habitat has lead to lower nesting populations. 
- Decreased Flow: The development of the Everglades involved drainage and 
diversion of much of the water in south Florida to the extent that much less 
water flows through the park.  These lower water flows have caused dramatic 
declines in biological productivity at the estuarine fringe of mangroves, a 
border area that used to hold the densest nesting colonies. 
- Damped Fluctuations of Water Level: Water levels fluctuate seasonally in 
South Florida, driving the ecology of the Everglades.  These fluctuations 
provide the means of food production and delivery.  Fish populations thrive 
and reproduce in times of flooding and are concentrated by lowering water 
levels to the point where wading birds can easily feed on them.  Water 
management schedules for canals in the Everglades have changed these 
hydrological patterns to the point where they are not synchronized with wading 
bird nesting cycles. 
- Distant Magnet: The decreases in nesting populations in the Everglades are 
matched by increases in other parts of the Southeastern United States, 
Louisiana and the Carolinas for example.  Population declines in the 
Everglades may not wholly reflect lowered ecological conditions there so 
much as better or improving conditions elsewhere that have drawn the 
populations to distant sites. 
-  Mercury: Mercury concentrations have increased in the atmosphere over this 
century, and many wetland soils absorb and concentrate deposition from the 
air.  Anaerobic water conditions can mobilize this metal from the soil, and it 
can pass up the food chain to wading birds.  Over time the latent toxic effects 
of mercury have decreased the nesting success of wading birds. 
-  Parasites: Increased agriculture upstream of the Everglades has released 
progressively larger amounts of nutrients into the surface water, and 
populations of parasites have thrived and increased as a result.  The increased 
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burden of parasites has diverted metabolic energy normally given to 
reproduction and thereby lowered the success of nesting of wading birds. 
 
Passive and Active Adaptation 
How can understanding of these alternative explanations be integrated at the 
same time that one must manage the system?  Walters (1986) introduced three 
concepts of how to structure management approaches in the AEAM process: (1) 
Evolutionary (“trial and error”) which starts with a haphazard set of choices and 
progressively winnows these down to a better subset to improve results; (2) Passive 
Adaptive which utilizes historical data to select or construct the a response model 
(“single best estimate”), and the management decision is made assuming this model is 
correct; (3) Active Adaptive which uses historical data to establish a suite of 
competing hypotheses or response models, and the manager’s policy choice reflects a 
balancing of anticipated performance in the short term with the longer term advantage 
of knowing which hypothesis is most correct (Walters and Holling 1990).   
Two problems arise with passive adaptive approaches.  First, the effects of 
management interventions are confounded with effects of the environment.  This is 
evident in the long and bitter debates about whether fishing effort or environmental 
effects (climate, watershed habitats lost to silt from logging) are primarily to blame for 
collapsed fisheries (Walters and Collie 1988).  A second, and more fundamental, 
problem is that passive adaptive policies may allow us to miss opportunities to 
improve the performance of system.  This might occur if the ‘right’ model and the 
‘wrong’ model both predict the same response pattern, and the system is managed as 
if the wrong model is correct (Walters and Holling 1990). 
So what should a manager do in pursuing an active adaptive approach so as to 
properly engage a suite of alternative explanations?  No hypothesis has an exclusive 
lock on the truth, and each is to some degree plausible.  The answer lies in balancing 
between two areas: 1) considering the policy implications of the entire suite of 
hypotheses, and 2) developing a process to sort between all the hypotheses. 
(Gunderson 1998).  In the first case, if all hypotheses point toward similar policies, 
then one can proceed and manage in a flexible way.  In the Everglades example above, 
if all hypotheses pointed toward water dynamics as the reason for nesting loss, then a 
set of management experiments could be developed to test these ideas.  One set of 
tests would address most or all hypotheses at the same time.  If the suite of hypotheses 
do not point toward the same policy implications, then any policy that is firmly and 
irreversibly established would be doomed from the outset.  For example, if the Distant 
Magnet hypothesis were closest to the truth, then any water-based policy would not 
only fail to achieve the conservation goal but would erode the trust of stakeholders 
who are participating in the AEAM process (Light et al 1995). 
The second approach, sorting between competing hypotheses, is generally 
done in the assessment stage of AEAM.  In the case of the Everglades, an active 
adaptive approach might have recommended a policy of monitoring wading bird 
populations at much larger scales while experimenting with a qualitatively different 
set of manipulations (water flow, periodicity, or nutrient removal) to try to tease out 
which of the competing explanations holds the most promise.  The AEAM process 
counters the tradition of casting a policy into concrete through law by iteratively 
testing these sets of hypotheses through the years and making recommendations to 
adapt as results and understanding develop. 
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ADAPTIVE PROCESSES APPLIED TO RIVER FLOODING 
 
Adaptive Practices for River Flooding in North America 
The United States has a 150-year history of federal programs assuming 
responsibility for flood control and risk management that emphasized structural flood 
control, such as levees, channels and dams (Faber 1997).  But all that has begun to 
change with the Great Mississippi River Flood of 1993. In fact a rash of major floods 
(Galloway 1998) have hit the nation during the 1990s including: in California 
(1995,1997,1998), Georgia and Alabama (1994) Texas (1995), Red River of the North 
(1997) and now the massive flooding in North Carolina associated with Hurricane 
Floyd (September 1999). When adjusted for inflation, since 1951 flood losses have 
tripled to over $4 Billion per year. 
While Adaptive Environmental Assessments have been applied in a number of 
major river basins over the past 20 years in the United States including the Truckee-
Carson, San Joaquin/ Sacramento Bay-Delta, the Colorado, the Upper Mississippi and 
Platte rivers, most of these assessments have dealt with fish and wildlife issues and 
not flooding directly.  However, efforts are currently underway exploring the 
possibilities for developing AEA assessments in some of the watersheds in the Red 
River of the North.  
But that is not to say that more adaptive management strategies are not 
becoming part of flood management programs.  The results of the Great Mississippi 
River Flood of 1993 and the subsequent White House Task Force review attest to the 
fact that thinking and actions are changing.  It was “The Great Flood of 1993” that 
seriously touched nine Midwest states along the upper Mississippi River and pushed 
the decision-makers to reconsider the floodplain management issues. The moment 
arrived to choose between the management focused on the economic development and 
the endeavor to balance economic and environmental outputs of floodplains. 
The Mississippi River begins in north central Minnesota and flows 2,350 miles 
to its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico, falls 1,463 feet and drains 1.25 millon square 
miles or 41 percent of the continental United States.  The Upper Mississippi River 
basin drains approximately 714,000 square miles above the confluence of the Ohio 
River.  The Upper Mississippi River basin is composed of many smaller sub-
watersheds that vary widely in physical characteristics such as topography, land use, 
soil types.  The upland watershed characteristics across the upper basin have changed 
considerably over the past 100 years significantly increasing runoff with the 
conversion of tall-grass prairie wetland and oak savannas to agricultural land and 
urban uses.  The upper Mississippi River System floodplain is mainly used for 
agricultural purposes (68.8% of the floodplain). The lands used for crops and small 
farm communities are protected by the agricultural levees. There are several 
residential, industrial and commercial areas of bigger urban concentrations (5% of the 
surface) behind the urban levees. In addition the runoff is controlled in great measure 
by regulation of large dam and reservoir projects on the main stem. Reservoirs, like 
levees reduce the flood threats to many downstream communities but at the same time 
create a false sense of security encouraging many people to settle riverbanks and 
become victims of major floods. 
In all the impacted area over 20 million acres (8.1 million ha) (Wright 1996), 
more than 35 million farms were flooded, 12.7 million acres (5.1 million ha) of corn 
and soybeans, which is 8% of the total for nine Midwestern sates, were not harvested 
(IFMRC 1994). It was a huge catastrophe from human perspective, 100,000 
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residences were flooded (source Disaster Housing Program), 52 people killed, 74,000 
became homeless, 30,000 jobs were disrupted (Wilkins 1996, Wright 1996). In the 
lower part of Upper Mississippi River this Flood was estimated to be a 500-year 
event. 
The Great Flood of 1993 has had both immediate and longer-term adaptive 
influence on floodplain management in the United States.  The flood did result in the 
immediate, voluntary relocation of more than 8,000 homes and business or 10% of all 
structures damaged (Faber 1997). The false sense of security offered by dams and 
levees has been dealt a significant blow. An ongoing potentially escalating sense of 
vulnerability to flooding is being recognized and the United States’ approach to 
floodplain management is moving in a new direction.  In January 1994 the Interagency 
Floodplain Management Review Committee (IFMRC) was directed to assess the 
causes and impacts of the Midwest flood and to propose the recommendations for 
policy changes.  Basically, the report called for sharing the challenge emphasized the 
need for responsibility and accountability for floodplain management to be distributed 
among various levels of government and with the citizens: 
 
 Avoidance of unwise use of the flood plain; 
 Minimization of vulnerability when floodplains are used; 
 Increased education and the outreach to people in flood prone areas; 
 Mitigation of damage when floods  do occur; and 
 Protection and enhancement of natural resources and the functions of 
floodplains. (Galloway 1998) 
 
A movement to reduce flood damages through nonstructural means, such as limiting 
the irresponsible development of floodplains or evacuating those at most risk, slowly 
has become the alternative to the construction of dams, levees and floodwalls. An 
alternative vision in which the frequently flooded communities would become river-
focused parks and recreational areas, their former occupants would be relocated to 
safer areas on higher grounds is taking shape in Grafton, IL where 900 people, 262 
structures were moved to relocation site above the floodplain.  A large part of St. 
Charles MO was also relocated (Faber 1997).  Federal disaster laws were changed to 
encourage these actions such actions by setting aside of 15% of all disaster relief for 
relocation, land acquisition and other forms of hazard mitigation. It was followed by 
20 million US dollars annual program to support such projects. In addition the 
insurance reform in October 1994 made it possible for the flood insurance to help pay 
the costs of elevating or relocating damaged buildings. On the other side the new 
constructions were strictly controlled by state and local officials by requiring them to 
be at elevation well out of harm’s way. In the Midwest the increasing cost in meeting 
the more severe floodplain management requirements is discouraging people from 
floodplain development.  
To preserve and enhance natural resources of floodplains the environmental 
interest in some lands are being acquired from the willing sellers. That simplifies the 
restoration of bottomland and related upland habitat and flood storage. On the other 
hand the pressure is put on changing land uses behind the levees and in the upland 
areas. Some of the owners choose to convert from row crops to alternative crops or 
silviculture or return their lands to natural state under many kinds of possible 
easements. As of 1997 more than 50,000 acres of Midwest floodplain farmlands were 
put into federal easement programs. In addition Congress and Clinton Administration 
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increased funding for the small-scale restoration projects of the Mississippi River 
floodplains and the 1996 Farm Bill included provisions for the farmers to increase 
conservation activities in floodplain environments. 
The importance of sharing the responsibility and accountability for 
accomplishing floodplain management among all levels of government and with 
citizen participation is working according to Galloway (1998):   
"Many state legislatures and executive agencies have examined their flood 
management policies and moved toward tighter controls.  Federal and state 
government have relocated…25,000 families nationwide.  State and federal agencies 
have acquired interest in over 250,000 acres of flood-prone land." 
 
While the Great Flood of 1993 has not resulted in a new National Floodplain 
Management Act, the nation is clearly moving away from federally dominated 
structural solutions to increased flood risk.  Clearly there is more involvement of the 
states, bottom-up public involvement process and community-based floodplain 
management. 
The nation is moving away from fragmentary approach to floodplain 
ecosystems in which each levee, each dam was a separate project; it becomes replaced 
by the systems approach. A Minnesota mediation plan worked out following the 
disastrous floods of 1997 in the Red River of the North (RRN) show promise of 
taking watershed approaches in which flood-damage reduction and restoration of 
ecosystem services are being given separate but equal consideration.  The Wild Rice 
Watershed District in the RRN has developed a "systems approach" framework paper 
that sets forth a collaborative watershed approach much as would be incorporated in 
an AEA effort.  The framework paper sets up interdisciplinary groups, in partnerships 
of federal and state agencies, tribes, local governments, and private organizations to 
problem solving and broaden the set of alternative solutions.  A watershed-level 
hydrologic model to help evaluate alternatives in the decision making process is under 
development.  
In dealing with increased incidents and cost of flooding, the United States 
during the 199s has slowly begun to shift its fundamental strategy of federal flood 
control and prediction.  Learning to live with and profit from rivers' variability is 
starting to make sense economically and ecologically.  This is Adaptive Management.  
Currently, most approaches to addressing the aftermath of the devastating floods seem 
to be small and limited in scope, not basin-wide and multifunctional in design.  This 
trend seems to part of a much broader based movement in the United States for 
increased grass-roots efforts to redefine the way water and land-related resources are 
managed.  With patience and perseverance future decades will bring opportunities to 
scale up these more adaptive approaches to basin and landscape levels of 
management. 
 
AEAM Initiatives in European River Basins 
Many factors contribute at different scales to the integrity of systems of man 
and nature, such as river basins. Besides the surprising dynamism of systems, one 
reason that “solutions” to resource management problems are short-lived is that they 
are incomplete; they address one set of factors, either ecology, economics, or politics, 
or they address more than one set but only at one scale.  For example, long time 
practitioners, such as J. Korman (pers. comm),  have pointed out that dialogue-based 
management efforts such as AEAM can stall because of failure at the local, political 
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level to find “local champions.”  Initiatives directed at regional and national efforts 
may founder if no locally respected people are persistently keeping the dialogue 
process on the agenda or rallying local participation. Alternatively, political 
organizing might unify local populations around their own experience but wither in 
the face of macro-scale dynamics, such as global economics or regional climate 
change.  How can understanding and policy be functionally and flexibly integrated 
and then harnessed to address a problem from all disciplines, sectors and scales that 
pertain? 
A number of public and private institutions are currently discussing how to test 
AEAM as a public learning and management tool in various river basins in Europe.  
Such tests would aim to probe AEAM’S capacity to embrace a more comprehensive 
group of factors acting over a wider range of scales.  We describe below how we 
might use AEAM to address flooding within the context of a wider set of factors that 
interact to affect the integrity of a river basin in Central Europe.  Opportunities that 
AEAM might exploit became apparent during participation [Sendzimir] in the Czech 
Republic with a similar dialogue process, Landscape Stewardship (Lucas 1992, 
Endicot  1993, Western and Wright. 1994, Mitchell and Brown. 1998) a highly cost-
effective way to get a quick overview of a complex management problem while 
initiating an open discussion in the region.  In Moravia it was applied as a brief, 
intensive survey of all the factors that contributed to flood risk and damage on the 
Morava river in 1997 by a multi-disciplinary “expert” team over one week’s time.  
Specifically, we hope to clarify how the openings created by effective probing 
processes such as Landscape Stewardship could be built upon by the longer-term 
capabilities of AEAM.  The capabilities we discuss here include the capacity to add 
scientific rigor to the process of posing and testing questions at a number of scales, to 
help lay and professional people to visualize the consequences of their assumptions as 
they affect the complex dynamics of floods, and to sustain a dialogue that transcends 
the limited horizons of politics or funding institutions. 
Landscape Stewardship does bring distant and local experience to the same 
arena, namely, the public inquiry and final report put out by the outside team. During 
these public hearings one could compare local, regional and continental responses to 
flooding in terms of dike location and farming practices. For example, local Czech 
farmers complained that dikes magnify the damage of large scale (dike-breaching) 
floods by retaining water on fields long enough to kill biological activity in the soil, 
thereby prolonging the recovery period to several years before planting could resume.  
However, downstream on the same river we learned that the Austrians have 
experimented with moving dikes uphill to increase the water volume the floodplain 
can accommodate, removing row crops and using the floodplain as a wet meadow for 
grazing (Umweltbundesamt 1999).  The Czechs admired how the Austrian portion of 
the Morava river absorbed with no damage the same volumes that flooded upstream 
portions of Moravia and how quickly flood waters receded without the dikes. They did 
point out, though, that Austrian farmers on the Morava depend on EU subsidies to 
market their floodplain cattle.  In this case, the scale mismatch between local Czech 
economies and EU continental subsidies closed the discussion on a point of 
frustration.  If an AEAM process could reframe this dialogue as a search for 
alternative hypotheses to test about what makes a river community vulnerable to 
flooding, perhaps the Austrians could be constructively used as an outside lesson on 
how to approach the problem at more than one scale. This and other hunches could be 
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tested in local experiments with dike relocation coupled with innovations on national 
policy on agricultural subsidies.   
Our landscape stewardship discussion in Moravia brought to light similar 
interesting experiments in the Netherlands.  Centuries of Dutch experience in flood 
control have lead them to an impasse where further technical solutions do not add 
much to their capacity to absorb the effects of future floods on the Rhine.  They 
conclude (T. Smits, Rijkswaterstaat Nederlands , pers. comm.) that their history of 
technical applications was based on a mistaken premise that river basin morphometry 
and land use should be modified solely for human uses.  Specifically, over centuries 
they had changed the shape of river basins to accommodate the size and shape of 
transportation vessels (channelizing) and the needs of habitation and row crop 
agriculture (diking at the lowest possible elevation on the floodplain).  Their new 
program “Room for the River” (Middelkoop and de Boo, 1999) reflects a new 
philosophy that human use functions should be adapted to the shape of river basins 
that naturally result from flooding histories.  This program is currently being 
translated into land use change and relocation of inhabitants and dikes on certain 
floodplains. Row crops are being converted to forest, marsh or wet grazing meadows. 
Inhabitants are being relocated, with compensation, to higher elevations, and dikes are 
being relocated back from the main channel such that the entire floodplain cross 
section can accommodate a much larger volume of water. 
It is difficult, however, to learn from foreigners or to experiment with your 
own intuition or the hunches of your neighbors when the flood aftermath is strained by 
mistrustful casting and/or avoidance of blame.  Such an atmosphere can’t be dispelled 
in a week.  Longer time periods are needed under a structured framework where one 
feels safe to guess, safe to play with novel combinations of ideas.  But the grace of 
sufficient time is rarely granted, because the scale of processes that cause crises is 
usually much larger than that of election cycles or funding horizons.  One of the key 
political engagements of this era is to help political and funding agendas to match 
their cycles of operation and conceptual horizons with the scales at which problems 
develop.  New decision mechanisms must be introduced if politicians, insulated from 
long term consequences by short (2 – 6) year election cycles, cannot appreciate such 
larger scale processes as flood frequencies, dam basin sedimentation rates, fish 
migration cycles and climate change.  AEAM provides a transparent mechanism 
whereby professionals that are normally constrained by their organization’s time 
horizon can safely consider policy consequences at a multitude of time scales. 
At the outset AEAM addresses mistrust head-on by building consensus around 
what we agree that we do and don’t know.  Scientific discipline allows lay people to 
add their experience to the discussion and pose their questions in ways that are 
testable.  This also coaxes policy specialists (corporate or government bureaucrats) to 
reframe their policy solutions as useful questions for testing.  The tension of avoiding 
blame is really part of the general fear of being pinned or locked into a bad solution, 
particularly those from outside one’s own school of thought.  AEAM works to defuse 
this fear by encouraging multiple interpretations and then repeatedly testing the best 
candidate hunches. The danger of locking into one solution is minimized by capacity 
to test and then reassess.  This is done in an iterative cycle of understanding enriched 
with multiple views, followed by testing and monitoring, that is fed back into a new 
round of understanding and testing.   
In any discussion a key difficulty in building consensus is for all participants to 
see the consequences of their own assumptions or those underlying any other 
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alternative hypotheses.  The number of varying inputs to flooding make this especially 
difficult in managing a river valley.  The combined variabilities in time and space of 
climatic inputs and river basin morphometry make it virtually impossible for any 
person to visualize the space/time dynamics of flooding.  For example, precipitation, 
whether rainfall or fallout from Chernobyl, is no longer considered regionally 
homogenous; locally patchy models of precipitation are now sought for prediction.  
And it is very hard to assess the consequences to flooding of adding or removing or 
changing channels, dikes, wetlands or land uses.  AEAM can abet such visualization 
by making sophisticated hydrological modeling accessible to anyone through 
computer interfaces.  The various effects to flood behavior or the economy that result 
from such policy choices as changes in dike location, land use practice, transportation 
routes, lock and dam operation, can all be explored in parallel using computer 
simulation within the guided discussion framework of AEAM. 
As with the Everglades, a disciplined discussion of the sources of flood risk 
that threaten the integrity of river valley ecosystems and society starts to become 
practical when a number of plausible and testable hypotheses can be posed.  Then the 
various philosophical and political factions can unite around a test of the best group of 
these hypotheses, and the community can come together in the monitoring and re-
evaluation of our understanding.  We list below some potential examples, with 
caricature titles, of hypotheses about sources of flooding risk, though an actual AEAM 
process would probably use local and distant experiences to generate far more: 
1. Engineered Security: Technical means (channels, dikes and locks) are 
inadequate and have to be changed (modified and/or increased) to meet 
future flooding potential. 
2. Landscape Sponge: Land use change is reducing water storage capacity 
and increasing run-off speed faster than any technical, commercial or 
ecological response can remedy and must be halted, modified or reversed. 
3. Innovative Enterprise: Commercial and/or agriculture practices need to be 
changed such that the needs of transportation and agriculture require less 
investment in anti-flood defenses such as technology or land use change. 
4. “Room for the River”: Flooding results from inadequate capacity of the 
floodplain to accommodate flood volumes because basin morphometry has 
been excessively modified to serve human use functions.   
The danger of flooding does not remain constant but changes with time due to 
the evolution of society and such shifting environmental processes as climate change.  
To sustain a focus on this shifting flood risk, some sort of dialogue such as AEAM 
needs to continue the effort to understand and respond to all the critical sources of 
change.  If we can develop such a capacity for enlightened dialogue, the critical 
information needed to face a crisis may not be hidden in libraries or the collective 
intuitions of bureaucrats or academicians; it may be floating on the crest of a rich 
discussion that is in the public domain.  And such discussion may be the soundest 
platform for anticipating and adapting to crises, however inevitable they may be in a 
warming climate. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The policy-based experimentation advocated by adaptive management is 
essential to reduce the ecological, social, and economic costs of learning.  Adaptive 
management focuses upon developing alternative hypotheses, identifying gaps in 
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knowledge, and assessing what knowledge would most effectively distinguish 
alternative hypotheses and, therefore, could be most useful in setting and updating 
research and action priorities.  As Peterson et al (1997) state: 
 
“Rather than simply testing and rejecting individual hypotheses, 
scientists and decision makers must consider diverse sets of alternative 
hypotheses.  Alternatives need to be continually revised, modified, and 
discarded, based upon how they fare in tests against empirical data 
(Hilborn and Mangel 1996). Maintaining the status quo must be 
explicitly examined as one alternative among many, with its attendant 
consequences, benefits, and costs.  More often than not, policy 
decisions have multiple dimensions that are difficult, if not impossible, 
to convert into a single metric. In these cases, techniques such as multi-
attribute utility analysis, wherein tradeoffs between alternatives are 
evaluated using multiple metrics, may be necessary. In either case, such 
methods of analysis are best viewed not as authoritative objective 
procedures, but as modeling processes that provide a means of making 
underlying valuations open to scrutiny, discussion, and sensitivity 
analysis.” 
In order to exercise reasonable caution we should recognize that the greater 
our uncertainty, and therefore the less our capacity to precisely define risk, the more 
considered and "reversible" our management actions should be.  Data accumulation 
and analysis may narrow our sense of uncertainty, but our capacity to predict risk is 
persistently undercut by the scale of our actions in creating new uncertainties.  
Adaptive processes provide one of the most prudent frameworks for assessing and 
addressing the multiple scales at which flooding risk and damage emerge.   The 
laboratory for the theory and practice about floods has to be wider even than society; it 
has to span the range from local village experience to global sources of weather 
processes.  The hard lessons of the last 40 years mandate that we learn to address all 
these scales, flexibly and repetitively, so that the most important question is always at 
hand. 
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